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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 17511 
JERRY LONG 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of distributing a Schedule 
I controlled substance, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-B(l)A(a)(ii) (1953), 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury on 
November 20, 1980 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding. Pursuant~ 
his conviction, appellant was sentenced on December 12, 1980 
to an indeterminate term of up to five years in the Utah State 
Prison and fined $500.00. However, appellant's prison 
sentence was suspended and he was placed on a two-year 
probation. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that this Court affirm the 
1ud9ment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 5, 1981, Officer Jeff Winn, an undercover 
narcotics agent for the Pleasant Grove Police Department, 
purchased two tablets of L.S.D. from appellant for $6.00 (T. 
17). Officer Winn had met appellant and some friends of 
appellant's at approximately 8:25 that evening at the Beacon 
Cafe in Lindon, Utah (T. 14-16). Officer Winn had been 
waiting for Doug Aston, who was going to sell him some 
marijuana, when appellant and Gary Marchbanks came out of the 
cafe and got in Officer Winn's car (T. 16). Soon thereafter, 
Mr. Aston returned with the marijuana. During the 
conversation that ensued, appellant asked if anybody wanted to 
buy some "acid" (T. 16). 
Officer Winn agreed to purchase some L. S. D. from 
appellant for $6.00, which he paid in the Beacon Cafe parking 
lot (T. 17). After giving appellant the money, Officer Winn 
drove Dous Aston, Gary Marchbanks, and appellant, according to 
appellant's instructions, to a four-plex in Orem where 
appellant obtained the tablets of L.S.D. and gave them to 
Officer \':inn ( T. 1 7). The following morning the tablets were 
turned over to Officer Tom Paul of the Pleasant Grove Police 
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Department, who sent them to the State Health Lab for tests 
(T. 24). The tests confirmed that the tablets were L.S.D. (T, 
29). 
On or about the 16th of June, 1980, Officer Winn, 
after being released as an undercover agent, assisted in the 
arrest of appellant at appellant's home in Pleasant Grove (T. 
21). 
Prior to appellant's trial he made a motion to 
supress the evidence obtained by Officer Winn in Orem. This 
motion was denied by Judge Ballif (R. 12, 13). At trial 
appellant presented an alibi defense to show that he had not 
been at the Beacon Cafe on March 5, 1980, but that he had been 
celebrating a birthday with his brother. Appellant called u 
witnesses his sister, Cindy (T. 58), and his brother, Ben (T, 
42), to corroborate his story. Also testifying in behalf cl 
appellant was Gary Marchbanks, who stated that he did not go 
with appellant and Officer Winn on the night of the 5th (T. 
89). After presenting Mr. Marchbanks' testimony, counsel fm 
appellant indicated he had a few more witnesses (T. 95); 
however, after a moment defense counsel rested, indicating 
that the other witnesses were not present (T. 95). No requut 
was made at this time for a continuance, nor did the defense 
counsel explain to the court the nature of the testimony these 
witnesses would have given. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
C0'1PULSORY PROCESS. 
Before examining the merits of appellant's claim 
t~at he was denied his right to compulsory process, respondent 
sub~its that there are a number of procedural issues that 
should be considered. First, this Court has consistently held 
that it will not hear issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975). In 
Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 
P. 2d 399 (1970), this Court said: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper 
purpose is the final settlement of 
controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or 
theories of recovery to the trial court; 
and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus 
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation. Id. at 401. 
An examination of the record in the instant case 
discloses that appellant failed to raise this issue at trial. 
The record reveals that appellant's counsel, near the end of 
the defense, anticipated having a few more witnesses (T. 95); 
however, upon discovering that the witnesses were not present, 
appellant's counsel rested (T. 95). There is no indication 
that appellant requested a continuation to secure the 
-4-
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presence of his witnesses at trial, or that the court refused 
to allow the testimony of appellant's witnesses on the grounds 
that, the testimony was cumulative. No offer was made 
concerning anticipated testimony of the witnesses; therefore 
respondent submits that appellant's failure to request a 
continuance or to make an objection precludes him from 
claiming that he has been denied compulsory process on appeal. 
The second procedural issue, which becomes apparent 
upon reading appellant's brief, is that appellant cites a 
number of facts not contained within the record. There is no 
indication in the record that six subpoenas were delivered to 
the Utah County Constable, or that the Constable delivered 
some of the subpoenas 12 hours late. In addition, appellant's 
reference to the trial court's ruling that the testimony of 
the additional witnesses was merely cumulative is nowhere to 
be found in the record (appellant's brief, page 4). Finally, 
even though the record indicates there was a previous trial 
and that some of the witnesses who testified at the first 
trial did not testify at the second (R. 4), there is no way of 
telling what their testimony was or the effect it may have haci 
on the jury. 
It is fundamental that an appeal is limited to t~ 
proceedings in the lower court upon which the Judgment is 
based. U.R.C.P., Rule 75. In Tucker Realty Inc. v. 
-5-
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~' 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), this Court stated 
in response to an attempt to supplement the record with 
evidence which was not part of the lower court proceedings: 
It requires but a moment's reflection to 
realize what a chaotic situation would 
exist if after a judgment is entered and 
an appeal taken, the parties could keep 
on having supplemental proceedings, 
adducing new evidence, and forwarding the 
transcripts to the Supreme Court. The 
illogic and irregularity of attempting to 
do so is so obvious that further comment 
as to its impropriety is unnecessary. 
Id. at 413, 414. 
Respondent submits that the facts cited by appellant in Point 
I of his brief are not properly before this Court. Respondent 
further submis that it has no access to these facts and 
therefore cannot verify their accuracy. For these reasons 
this Court should not reach the merits of appellant's claim 
that his right to compulsory process has been denied unless 
appellant properly presents a complete record to this Court. 
If there are omissions in the record or if 
a?pellant has newly discovered evidence, there are alternative 
remedies he can pursue. Under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 75(h) errors or omissions in the record can be 
corrected. Rule 75(h) provides in part: 
If anything material to either party is 
omitted from the record on appeal by 
error or accident or is misstated 
therein, the parties by stipulation, or 
-6-
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the district court, either before or 
after the record is transmitted to the 
Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on a 
proper suggestion or of its own 
initiative, may direct that the omission 
or misstatement shall be corrected, and 
if necessary that a supplemental record 
shall be certified and transmitted by the 
clerk of the district court. All other 
questions as to the content and form of 
the record shall be presented to the 
Supreme Court. 
Respondent submits that if there has been an omission in the 
record, appellant should comply with the provisions of Rule 
75(h). 
A second remedy available to appellant, if he has 
discovered new evidence, is found in Utah Code Annotated, 
§75-35-24, (1953), as amended. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted 
"in the interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party." If appellant discovered after his trial 
that some of his witnesses were not present at trial because 
the Utah County Constable failed to timely deliver the 
subpoenas and that this, in fact, prejudiced him, then 
appellant should make a motion for a new trial. Further 
remedies available to appellant include petitioning for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus or a Writ of Coram Nobis under Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-7-
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Before addressing the merits of appellant's claim, 
respondent again points out the difficulty in making an 
argument wnen there is no way to verify the accuracy of 
appellant's allegations; however, even assuming the facts 
stated by appellant are true, respondent submits the trial 
court acted properly. Appellant states that persons unrelated 
to appellant did not testify at his second trial because of a 
constable's failure to timely serve them with a subpoena. 
Appellant also infers that he made a request at trial that 
would have enabled him to admit the testimony of these 
witnesses, but that this request was refused on the grounds 
that the testimony was cumulative (appellant's brief, page 4). 
Respondent agrees that appellant has the right to compulsory 
process; however, appellant's right to present competent 
evidence at trial is subject to the trial judge's discretion 
to exclude admissible evidence if the judge finds that the 
pro8ative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
che risk that its admission will cause any of the following 
problems: 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time, or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the 
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c} 
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party 
who has not had reasonable opportunity to 
anticipate that such evidence would be 
offered. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
-8-
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In this case numerous witnesses at trial testified that 
appellant was not with Officer Winn on March 5, 1980, the 
night, Officer Winn purchased the L. S. D. from appellant. They 
claim that appellant on that night was at another bar 
celebrating his birthday with his brother, Ben (See the 
testimony of Elmer Benson Long, T. 42; Cindy Marie Stowe, T. 
58; Jerry Long, T. 66; and Gary Marchbanks, T. 85). Appellant 
indicates in his brief that the other witnesses would have 
also testified that appellant was at a different location on 
March 5, 1980 than the location alleged by the state 
{appellant's brief, page 4). It is true that this additional 
testimony may have added a dimension to appellant's alibi 
defense; nevertheless, in view of the fact that numerous 
witnesses had testified that appellant was not with Officer 
Winn on March 5, 1980, the probative value of additional 
testimony was outweighed by the risk that a great deal of ti• 
would be consumed in granting a continuance to secure the 
presence of the additional witnesses at trial. 
Appellant argues that proof that he was prejudiced 
by the absence of these additional witnesses is established by 
the fact that he was not convicted with their testimony at his 
first trial, but was convicted without their testimony at his 
second trial. The fallacy of this argument is obvious. It is 
impossible to conclude from these facts that appellant's 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conviction in his second trial was caused by the absence of 
the additional witnesses. Many other factors could have 
intervened and resulted in his conviction. First, at 
appellant's second trial he was tried by a new set of jurors. 
second, at the second trial there might have been numerous 
dif:erences in the appearance and demeanor of those who 
testified which may have affected their credibility. Third, 
the strategies and arguments made by counsel for both sides 
might have been different in the second trial. Therefore, 
respondent submits that appellant's conviction at his second 
trial does not establish that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the additional testimony. 
Respondent submits that even if the exclusion of 
this additional testimony was error, this still would not be a 
oasis to reverse appellant's conviction. Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of 
the erroneous exclusion of evidence 
unless (a) it appears of record that the 
proponent of the evidence either made 
known the substance of the evidence in a 
form and by a method approved by the 
judge, or indicated the substance of the 
expected evidence by questions indicating 
the desired answers, and (b) the court 
which passes upon the effect of the error 
or errors is of the opinion that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had 
a substantial influence in bringing about 
a different verdict or finding. 
-10-
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In this case appellant provided substantial testimony to 
corroborate his alibi defense; however, the jury chose to 
beli~ve the police officer over the witnesses who testified 
appellant's behalf. There is no reason to believe that the 
additional testimony would have changed this result. 
Therefore, respondent submits that appellant was not 
prejudiced. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY OFFICER WINN IN 
OREM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant argues that Officer Winn exercised his 
authority outside the territorial limits of his jurisdictioo 
and therefore the evidence he obtained by such action should 
not have been admitted at trial. Appellant unsuccessfully 
moved to suppress this evidence on this ground. Respondent 
argues that on March 5, 1981 Officer Winn was working as an 
undercover narcotics agent for the Pleasant Grove Police 
Department, and that he consummated a drug sale in Orem which 
had begun within Officer Winn's jurisdiction. However, 
-
respondent submits that the authorities cited by appellant are 
not applicable to the facts of the instant case, that OfficH 
Winn acted properly under the circumstances, and that the 
evidence obtained by Officer Winn in Orem was properly 
admitted at trial. 
-11-
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-13-36 (1953), as 
ar:-,ended, which was in effect on March 5, 1981, gave police 
officers the authority to act outside their normal juris-
dictions in certain circumstances. This statute was enacted 
to promote cooperation between the various law enforcement 
agencies of this state and to protect local law enforcement 
agencies from liability arising from the actions of intruding 
police officers within the local jurisdiction. This purpose 
is manifest in the last line of subsection 2, which provides: 
Unless specifically requested to aid a 
police officer of another jurisdiction or 
otherwise as provided for by law, no legal 
responsibility for a police officer's actions 
outside his normal jurisdiction and as provided 
herein, shall attach to the local law enforce-
ment authority. 
Nothing in this statute refers to the admissibility of 
e,.-idence obtained by police officers outside their own 
jurisdiction. Therefore, since this statute was designed 
to promote effective law enforcement and not to confer 
rights upon defendants in criminal proceedings, respondent 
submits that the trial court properly denied appellant's 
motion to suppress the evidence (R. 12, 13). 
Furthermore, Officer Winn's participation in the 
druc "buy" did not require or involve the exercise of his 
-12-
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authority as a peace officer. This could have been 
accomplished by a private citizen or an informant who had no 
peace officer powers. Since Officer Winn did not make an 
arrest in Orem, he was not exercising his authority as a peac, 
officer in that jurisdiction and thus the st~tute does not 
apply at all. 
Even if this Court finds that the statute applies 
to this case, the conduct of Officer Winn in exercising peace 
officer authority beyond his own jurisdiction was justified 
under §77-13-36(b) since the offense was ongoing in each 
jurisdiction and was in fact "committed" in Officer Winn's 
presence in Orem. 
Appellant also asserts that Officer Winn's conduct 
outside his jurisdiction was controlled by Utah Code 
Annotated, <;,77-7-3 ( 1953), as amended. Section 77-7-3, which 
is essentially the same as Utah Code Annotated, §77-13-4 
(1953), as amended, (which was in effect when these events 
occurred) provides: 
A private person may arrest another; 
(1) For a public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence. 
(2) When the person arrested has 
committed a felony although not in his 
presence. 
(3) When a felony has been in fact 
committed and he has reasonable cause for 
believing the person arrested to have 
committed it. 
-13-
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The following reasons establish that this statute 
has no application to the instant case. First, this statute 
applies to arrests made by private persons. In the instant 
case appellant was arrested in Pleasant Grove three months 
after the drug sale (T. 21). Therefore, since the arrest took 
place in Officer Winn's jurisdiction, he was not acting as a 
private person when he made the arrest, but was acting in his 
official capacity as a police officer. 
Second, this statute provides that private persons 
can only make arrests under certain conditions; however, it 
does not require that those conditions exist before a private 
person can take any action. For example, a private person can 
take down a license plate number, get a description, or notify 
the police without first knowing that a felony has been 
CO!l\!1'.i tted. To hold that a private person could only assist 
the police when the conditions set forth in the statute are 
present would substantially hinder law enforcement. Third, 
the purpose of this statute is to protect private citizens 
froD civil liability arising from false arrest, and to 
proscribe the dangers of uncontrolled vigilantism. Its 
purpose is not to frustrate legitimate law enforcement 
activities. Com v. Harris, 415 N.E. 2d 216 (Mass. 1981). 
Some of these considerations distinguish People v. 
Aldapa, 17 Cal. App. 3d 184, 94 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1979) from 
-14-
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the instant case. In Aldapa, the court held that the 
defendant had been illegally arrested and therefore the 
evide.nce obtained pursuant to the arrest was inadmissible at 
trial. The court found that the officers who made the arrest 
outside their jurisdiction were acting as private persons. 
Therefore, the validity of the arrest was determined under 
§837 of the California Penal Code, which provided for arrest 
by private persons. Section 837 stated that a private pers~ 
may make an arrest "when a felony has been in fact committed, 
and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested 
to have committed it." In Aldapa the defendant was charged 
with possession and possession of a narcotic for sale. The 
court noted that the police officers had arrested the 
defendant prior to discovering a bag of heroin he had in his 
possession. Therefore, the arrest was not valid under §837 
because the police officers were not aware that a crime had 
been committed until after the arrest had been made. 
In Aldapa the evidence was inadmissible because it 
had been obtained as the result of an illegal arrest. In the 
instant case appellant does not challenge the validity of his 
arrest. Therefore, he cannot claim that the evidence obtained 
by Officer Winn in Orem was inadmissible because it was 
obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest. The logical 
inference, then, from appellant's argument is that Aldapa 
-15-
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stands for the proposition that any evidence obtained by a 
private person before he/she knows the defendant has committed 
A cri~e is inadmissible. Respondent submits that Aldapa is 
not subject to such a broad interpretation. 
hppellant further asserts that Officer Winn's 
conduct was unauthorized and therefore illegal. Respondent 
subrni~s that Officer Winn's conduct was authorized. Utah Code 
Annotated, §77-36-4 provides that a police officer can 
exercise his authority outside his normal jurisdiction in 
response to public offenses committed in his presence. The 
public offense committed by appellant in this case was the 
distribution of a controlled substance for value. Appellant 
offered to sell L.S.D. to Officer Winn, took six dollars from 
Winn ~or the drug, and gave Officer Winn two tablets of L.S.D. 
('C. 16, 17). Appellant obviously committed the offense in 
Officer Winn's presence and therefore Officer Winn's conduct 
was aJthorized. Furthermore, even assuming that Officer 
Winn's actions were unauthorized, that does not mean his acts 
were illegal. 
Officer Winn's conduct in the instant case was not 
like ~~at taken by the police in Aldapa, who conducted 
numerous surveillances of the defendant's house for a three-
rnonth period and eventually arrested the defendant without 
ever notifying the local authorities. Here Officer Winn did 
-16-
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not have time to notify Orem officials once the buy began. 
The only alternative to the course of action he took was to 
ref4se to go to Orem to get the L.S.D. This not only would 
have caused the sale to fall through, but it might have bloi:· 
Officer Winn's cover as well. Certainly the. legitimate 
concerns of law enforcement justify Officer Winn's actions i: 
this case. See Com. v. Harris, 415 N.E. 2d 216 (1981). If 
appellant's view as to the operation of the statute were 
adopted, no police officer in a case such as this, where t~ 
commission of a crime begins in one jurisdiction and culmiatE 
in another, could follow the defendant into the other 
jurisdiction to allow the crime to be completed. Defendants 
in such a situation could undertake drug sales with impuni~ 
merely by making the exchange in a different jurisdiction ~r 
the one in which the original contact is made. Such a burde:. 
on law enforcement is clearly not contemplated by the statutE 
In consideration of these facts respondent submits that 
officer Winn acted properly and that the evidence he obtaine: 
was properly adm.itted at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant claims that he was denied his right to 
compulsory process at trial; however, appellant did not raisE 
this issue in the lower court, and therefore he cannot raise 
-17-
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it f:x the first time on appeal. As part of his argument, 
appellant refers to many facts which cannot be found in the 
of£1c1al record. Respondent submits that before this Court 
considers the merits of appellant's claim, appellant should 
follow established procedures to correct or supplement the 
record if it contains mistakes or omissions. Even if this 
~ourt should decide to reach the merits of this issue, 
respondent submits that the trial court properly excluded the 
testimony of appellant's additional witnesses under Rule 45 of 
the Ctah Rules of Evidence and that the admission of the 
evidence would not have had a substantial influence on the 
verdict. 
hppellant's second claim is that evidence obtained 
by Officer Winn outside the limits of his jurisdiction should 
':ave been suppressed at trial; however, §77-13-4 was not 
designed to frustrate law enforcement, but to promote it 
t~rough orderly cooperation between the various law 
e~forcement authorities. Respondent submits that Officer Winn 
complied with (77-13-4, that he acted reasonably, and did not 
~io:ate any of defendant's rights. 
-18-
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evidence. 
Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the 
DATED this 6th day of October, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON "l 
EJ;J-"1/,~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief to Philip G. Jones, attorney fu 
appellant, McCullough & Jones, 930 South State Street, Sui~ 
10, Orem, Utah, 84057, this 6th day of 
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